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Abstract	
Numbers,	rates	and	proportions	of	those	remanded	in	custody	have	increased	significantly	in	
recent	decades	across	a	range	of	jurisdictions.	In	Australia	they	have	doubled	since	the	early	
1980s,	such	that	close	to	one	in	four	prisoners	is	currently	unconvicted.	Taking	NSW	as	a	case	
study	and	drawing	on	the	recent	New	South	Wales	Law	Reform	Commission	Report	on	Bail	
(2012),	this	article	will	identify	the	key	drivers	of	this	increase	in	NSW,	predominantly	a	form	
of	 legislative	hyperactivity	 involving	constant	changes	 to	the	Bail	Act	1978	(NSW),	changes	
which	remove	or	restrict	the	presumption	in	favour	of	bail	for	a	wide	range	of	offences.	The	
article	will	then	examine	some	of	the	conceptual,	cultural	and	practice	shifts	underlying	the	
increase.	 These	 include:	 a	 shift	 away	 from	 a	 conception	 of	 bail	 as	 a	 procedural	 issue	
predominantly	 concerned	 with	 securing	 the	 attendance	 of	 the	 accused	 at	 trial	 and	 the	
integrity	of	the	trial,	to	the	use	of	bail	for	crime	prevention	purposes;	the	diminishing	force	of	
the	 presumption	 of	 innocence;	 the	 framing	 of	 a	 false	 opposition	 between	 an	 individual	
interest	in	liberty	and	a	public	interest	in	safety;	a	shift	from	determination	of	the	individual	
case	by	 reference	 to	 its	own	particular	 circumstances	 to	determination	by	 its	 classification	
within	 pre‐set	 legislative	 categories	 of	 offence	 types	 and	 previous	 convictions;	 a	 double	
jeopardy	effect	arising	 in	 relation	 to	people	with	previous	 convictions	 for	which	 they	have	
already	been	punished;	and	an	unacknowledged	preventive	detention	effect	arising	from	the	
increased	emphasis	on	risk.	Many	of	these	conceptual	shifts	are	apparent	in	the	explosion	in	
bail	 conditions	 and	 the	 KPI‐driven	 policing	 of	 bail	 conditions	 and	 consequent	 rise	 in	
revocations,	especially	in	relation	to	juveniles.	
	
The	 paper	will	 conclude	with	 a	 note	 on	 the	NSW	Government’s	 response	 to	 the	NSW	LRC	
Report	in	the	form	of	a	Bail	Bill	(2013)	and	brief	speculation	as	to	its	likely	effects.	
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Introduction	
Imprisonment	rates	across	Australian	States	and	Territories	have	increased	significantly,	albeit	
variably,	over	the	last	two	to	three	decades,	with	the	lift‐off	point	occurring	roughly	in	the	mid	
1980s.	From	1984	to	2008	the	national	imprisonment	rate	rose	from	86	per	100,000	population	
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to	175,	an	increase	of	206%	(ABS	2011;	Cunneen	et	al.	2013	forthcoming:	ch.	3).	This	has	since	
fallen	 to	 168	 per	 100,000	 adult	 population	 (ABS	 2012:	 8).	 Imprisonment	 rates	 vary	
considerably	 across	 the	 jurisdictions,	 from	825.5	per	 100,000	 in	 the	Northern	Territory	 (NT)	
followed	 by	 267.3	 in	 Western	 Australia	 (WA),	 171.2	 in	 New	 South	 Wales	 (NSW),	 158.9	 in	
Queensland	(Qld)	and	111.7	in	Victoria	(Vic)	(ABS	2012:	Table	3.3).		
	
A	 significant	 component	 of	 the	 increase	 in	 imprisonment	 rates	 has	 been	 the	 rise	 in	 people	
remanded	in	custody.	Nationally,	as	at	30	June	2012,	23.4%	of	prisoners	(6,871	out	of	29,381)	
were	 remanded	 in	 custody:	 that	 is,	 were	 unconvicted.	 (ABS	 2012:	 Table	 3.1)	 This	 figure	
significantly	understates	the	position	as	it	is	based	on	the	traditional	snapshot	style,	‘on	one	day’	
prison	census	figures.	If	the	proportion	of	remand	prisoners	was	calculated	as	a	percentage	of	
prison	 receptions	 (a	 figure	 not	 provided	 in	 ABS	 or	 other	 national	 statistics),	 then	 the	 figure	
would	 be	 far	 higher.	 In	NSW	 in	 2010,	 for	 example,	 remand	prisoners	made	 up	 10,342	out	 of	
14,288	prison	receptions,	or	72.4%	of	the	total	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	4.6).		
	
Nationally,	 the	 remand	 rate	of	 unsentenced	prisoners	per	100,000	of	population	has	doubled	
from	18.9	in	1998	to	38.8	in	2011	(NSW	LRC	2012:	Table	F.2,	338).	There	have	been	increases	
in	remand	in	custody	rates	 	 in	all	 jurisdictions	over	that	period	as	follows:	NSW,	22.2	to	49.1;	
Vic,	12.9	to	19.6;	Qld,	18.4	to	33.4;	South	Australia	(SA),	22.8	to	52.1;	WA,	21.3	to	46.8;	Tasmania	
(Tas),	8.8	to	21.5;	NT,	59.5	to	169	(NSW	LRC	2012).	Remand	imprisonment	has	increased	faster	
than	 the	 sentenced	 imprisonment	 rate.	 In	2012	unsentenced	prisoners	as	a	proportion	of	 the	
total	prison	population	 ranged	between	 roughly	one	 fifth	and	one	 third	across	 the	Australian	
jurisdictions	 as	 follows:	 NSW,	 25.7%;	 Vic,	 20.4%;	 Qld,	 22.3%;	 SA,	 31.3%;	 WA,	 19.6%;	 Tas,	
17.8%;	 NT,	 24.7%;	 Australian	 Capital	 Territory	 (ACT),	 29.1	 (ABS	 2012:	 para.	 3.1).	 Juvenile	
remand	rates	have	also	been	increasing	in	recent	years,	by	17%	nationally	between	2006‐7	and	
2009‐10	and	by	25%	in	NSW	between	2006‐7	and	2009‐10	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	4.27;	see	also	
Richards	and	Lyneham	2010).		
	
As	NSW	is	the	most	populous	State	and	has	the	largest	prison	population,	around	one‐third	the	
national	total,	NSW	trends	have	the	most	significant	impact	on	national	figures.	In	1970	in	NSW,	
unsentenced	 prisoners	 as	 a	 proportion	 of	 the	 total	 prison	 population	 comprised	 11.5%,	
increasing	 to	 22.7%	 by	 2010	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 para.	 4.3).	 NSW	 remand	 in	 custody	 numbers	
increased	 from	711	 in	1995	 to	2502	 in	2010	 (NSW	LRC	2012:	Table	4.1).	NSW	remand	 rates	
increased	from	around	16	to	45	per	100,000	of	population	between	1994	and	2010	(NSW	LRC	
2012:	Figure	4.3).	The	percentage	of	adult	Indigenous	remandees	in	NSW	increased	from	11.5%	
in	 1994	 to	 26.4%	 in	 2011	 and,	 between	 2001	 and	 2008,	 the	 proportion	 of	 Indigenous	
remandees	rose	72%	(Fitzgerald	2009).		
	
Drivers	of	remand	rates	
The	above	 figures	 show	a	general	but	variable	 increase	 in	unsentenced	remand	numbers	and	
rates	across	Australian	jurisdictions.	Other	jurisdictions	such	as	New	Zealand	and	Canada	have	
shown	similar	increases.	In	New	Zealand	the	remand	population	is	currently	around	20%	of	the	
prison	population,	increasing	from	700	persons	in	1998	to	over	1800	in	2011	(NZ	Department	
of	Corrections	2011:	22)	 In	Canada	 the	 remand	population	 increased	 as	 a	 rate	 from	12.6	per	
100,000	 to	 39.1	 in	 2007	 (Webster,	 Doob	 and	 Myers	 2009:	 80),	 with	 half	 of	 all	 provincial	
prisoners	on	remand,	while	the	 imprisonment	rate	generally	remained	stable	or	decreased.	 In	
2009‐2010	 adults	 on	 remand	 constituted	 58%	 of	 the	 total	 prison	 population	 (Porter	 and	
Calverley	2011:	2).	Youth	on	remand	also	outnumbered	those	in	sentenced	custody	in	2010	for	
the	 third	 year	 in	 a	 row	 (Porter	 and	 Calverley	 2011:	 11).	 By	way	 of	 contrast,	 in	 England	 and	
Wales	 the	 prison	 remand	 population	 rose	 in	 the	 1980s,	 dipped	 in	 the	 early	 1990s	 and	 has	
stabilised	in	the	2000s	(Hucklesby	2009:	4‐6).	Between	1993	and	2011	the	remand	population	
was	‘relatively	stable	at	around	12‐13,000’	but	began	to	fall	from	early	2012	(Ministry	of	Justice	
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2013:	19).	This	is	despite	the	fact	that	between	June	1993	and	June	2012	the	prison	population	
in	England	and	Wales	‘increased	by	41,800	prisoners	to	over	86,000’	(Ministry	of	Justice	2013:	
1).	
	
Researchers	tend	to	emphasise	complexity,	variation,	insufficient	research,	poor	data	collection	
and	 the	 difficulty	 in	 identifying	 uniform	 drivers	 when	 attempting	 to	 explain	 increases	 (or	
stability)	 in	 remand	 rates.	 In	Canada,	Webster	 et	 al.	 (2009)	note	 the	 significant	differences	 in	
remand	rates	across	different	provinces;	 the	 fact	 that	 the	bail	process	 is	 taking	 longer	 than	 it	
did,	in	part	through	increased	adjournments;	the	larger	proportion	of	defendants	appearing	in	
court	 from	 custody;	 and	 increasing	 length	 of	 time	 on	 remand.	 While	 rejecting	 an	 ‘increased	
punitiveness’	thesis,	on	the	basis	that	imprisonment	rates	had	remained	stable,	they	argued	that	
‘Canada’s	 growing	 remand	 population	 is	 largely	 the	 product	 of	 an	 increasing	 culture	 of	 risk	
aversion	which	 is	 permeating	 the	 entire	 criminal	 justice	 system’	 so	 that	 ‘decisions	 are	 either	
being	 continually	 passed	 along	 to	 someone	 else	 or	 simply	 delayed	 by	 those	 responsible	 for	
them’	(Webster	et	al.	2009:	99).		
	
The	 leading	 Australian	 research	 on	 factors	 influencing	 bail	 decision‐making	 noted	 that	 the	
legislative	 framework	 in	 the	 two	 jurisdictions	 in	 the	 study	 (South	Australia	and	Victoria)	was	
broadly	 similar.	 The	 research	 identified	 lower	 remand	 rates	 in	 Victoria	 as	 ‘associated	 with	
enhanced	 police	 accountability	 for	 bail	 refusal,	 improved	 feedback	 loops	 between	 courts	 and	
police,	higher	transaction	costs	for	custodial	remand,	and	longer	bail	hearings’	(Sarre,	King	and	
Bamford	2006:	5).	The	authors	suggested	that:	‘the	key	to	isolating	the	critical	factors	affecting	
remand	 in	 custody	 trends’	 lay	 in	 ‘a	 focus	on,	 and	analyses	of,	 the	decisions	made	by	 the	non‐
judicial	participants	in	the	process,	especially	the	police	decision‐making	and	information	they	
bring	 to	 the	 courts’	 (Sarre,	 King	 and	 Bamford	 2006:	 6).	 Later	 work	 identified	 the	 key	 to	
understanding	 the	 different	 patterns	 as	 ‘recognising	 the	 way	 that	 the	 discretion	 of	 remand	
decision‐makers	 is	 shaped	by	 the	 legislative,	 social	 and	organisational	 contexts	 in	which	 they	
operate’	 (King,	Bamford	and	Sarre	2008:	24‐5;	2009	see	also	Bamford,	King	and	Sarre	1999a,	
1999b).	The	authors	suggested	that:	
	
…	 jurisdictions	 develop	 cultures	 around	 remand	 decision‐making	 as	 a	 result	 of	
the	 intersection	 of	 these	 contexts	 and	 that	 this	 culture	 is	 perpetuated	 by	 the	
beliefs	 of	 the	 remand	 decision‐makers	 about	 their	 roles,	 and	 the	 processes	 of	
remand	 decision‐making,	 specifically	 the	 speed	 and	 limited	 review	 of	 bail	
decisions.	(King,	Bamford	and	Sarre	2008:	25).		
	
They	noted	that	‘in	South	Australia	the	median	time	for	contested	bail	hearings	was	five	minutes	
whereas	 in	 Victoria	 it	 was	 18	 minutes’	 (King,	 Bamford	 and	 Sarre	 2008:	 26;	 Sarre,	 King	 and	
Bamford	 2006:	 4)	 and	 that	 the	 influence	 of	 therapeutic	 concerns	 in	 bail	 decisions	was	much	
stronger	in	Victoria.		
	
Using	NSW	as	a	case	study,	this	article	will	look	behind	the	remand	in	custody	increase	for	some	
of	 the	 key	 drivers;	 will	 posit	 some	 suggested	 conceptual,	 cultural	 and	 practice	 shifts,	 and	
examine	 some	 of	 their	 effects.	 The	 article	 will	 draw	 heavily	 on	 the	 NSW	 Law	 Reform	
Commission	Report	133,	Bail	(2012).1		
	
Immediate	drivers	in	NSW	
The	NSW	LRC	identified	the	immediate	drivers	of	increasing	remand	rates	as:		
	
 increasing	 rates	 of	 bail	 refusal	 in	both	Local	 (5%	 in	1995	 to	9%	 in	2009)	 and	Higher	
Courts	(24.5%	in	1994	to	33.4%	in	2010);		
 an	increase	in	the	average	(mean)	time	spent	on	remand;		
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 a	decrease	 in	 the	 extent	 to	which	bail	 is	 ‘dispensed	with’	 (Ringland	 and	Weatherburn	
2010);	and	
 an	increase	in	the	frequency	of	bail	revocations	(NSW	LRC	2012:	paras	4.8‐4.24).		
	
There	 is	one	important	feature	which	 is	missing	 from	this	picture,	strongly	emphasised	in	the	
NSW	LRC	Report,	and	that	is	the	high	proportion	of	short	term	remandees,	many	of	whom	are	in	
fact	released	to	bail	in	a	short	time.	The	Commission	noted	that:	
	
...	of	the	10,342	people	on	remand	in	2010	in	NSW,	5,218	or	55%	were	released	
as	 ‘unconvicted’	 or	 not	 subject	 to	 further	 custodial	 sentence,	 that	 is,	 they	were	
either	 released	 to	 bail,	 received	 a	 non‐custodial	 sentence,	 had	 already	 served	
their	full	sentence	while	on	remand,	had	all	charges	dismissed	or	were	acquitted.	
(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	4.13)	
	
Nearly	 two‐thirds	 of	 the	 5,218	 people	 released	 to	 custody	 as	 unconvicted	 in	 2010	 spent	 less	
than	 one	 month	 in	 custody;	 29.5%	 spent	 one	 day	 in	 prison	 and	 40.3%	 2‐7	 days.	 As	 the	
Commission	noted:	‘the	large	number	of	remand	prisoners	having	to	be	processed	for	very	short	
stays	is	time	consuming	and	costly’	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	4.14).	Reform	proposals	directed	at	
this	substantial	group	of	people	charged	with	less	serious	offences,	who	spend	short	periods	of	
time	 before	 release	 on	 bail	 or	 who	 are	 discharged	 upon	 conviction,	 have	 the	 potential	 to	
substantially	reduce	the	prison	reception	rate;	reduce	the	overall	 imprisonment	rate;	take	the	
pressure	 off	 Corrective	 Services	 thus	 enabling	 them	 to	 concentrate	 on	 effective	 programs	 for	
convicted	offenders;	and	substantially	reduce	costs.		
	
The	NSW	political	context:	legislative	hyperactivity	
While	 the	Bamford,	King	and	Sarre	study	noted	above	 found	 little	difference	 in	 the	 legislative	
provisions	governing	bail	in	South	Australia	and	Victoria,	the	frequency	of	amendments	to	the	
NSW	legislation	since	1979	when	the	reform‐oriented	Bail	Act	1978	came	into	force	constitutes	
a	 form	 of	 legislative	 hyperactivity	 which	 is	 exceptional.	 The	 constant	 amendments	 have	
contributed	 directly	 to	 the	 increased	 remand	 rates	 and	 to	 the	 shifting	 culture	 around	 bail	
decision‐making.	The	NSW	LRC	noted	that	between	1979	and	2011	there	had	been	85	separate	
amending	 Acts,	 some	 of	 which	 contained	 multiple	 amendments.	 The	 LRC	 classified	 the	
amendments	into	four	categories.	Firstly	there	were	‘terminological	or	technical’	changes	which	
included	 updating	 of	 references	 to	 offences	 and	 changes	 in	 criminal	 procedure,	 comprising	
some	 41	 amending	 Acts	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 para.	 3.35).	 Secondly	 ‘machinery	 or	 procedural’	
changes,	 of	 which	 there	 were	 19,	 dealt	 with	 issues	 such	 as	 appeal	 procedures,	 the	 most	
significant	 of	 which	 were	 the	 restrictions	 on	 repeat	 bail	 applications	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 para.	
3.36).	Thirdly	‘therapeutic	concerns’	comprising	three	amending	Acts,	involved	schemes	such	as	
the	Magistrates	Early	Referral	into	Treatment	(MERIT)	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	3.38).	The	fourth	
and	most	 significant	 category	was	of	 28	Acts	 amending	 the	presumptions	 and	 considerations	
originally	 set	 out	 in	 the	 1978	 Bail	 Act	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 para.	 3.39).	 Included	 in	 these	
amendments	was	exclusion	of	certain	offences	from	the	presumption	in	favour	of	bail	and	the	
introduction	of	a	presumption	against	bail	and	a	category	of		‘only	in	exceptional	circumstances’.		
	
It	 is	 this	 fourth	 category,	 amendments	 to	 the	 presumptions	 and	 considerations,	 that	 was	
identified	by	the	NSW	LRC	as	having	most	effect	and	is	therefore	of	most	interest.	The	NSW	LRC	
Report	Bail	embarked	on	a	detailed	listing	and	analysis	of	all	the	amending	Acts,	which	does	not	
need	to	be	repeated	here.	The	LRC	noted	that:		
	
…	 some	 of	 these	 changes,	 such	 as	 provisions	 in	 relation	 to	 domestic	 violence	
offences,	 followed	research	and	detailed	consideration,	consultation	and	debate.	
Others	 were	 made	 after	 individual	 cases	 attracted	 media	 attention	 without	
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evidence	of	the	incidence	of	offences	of	the	particular	kind.	(2012:	3.39;	see	also	
Booth	and	Townsley	2009:	41;	Brown	et	al.	2011:	177‐191;	Stubbs	2010:	485).	
	
The	key	changes	 that	had	 the	most	significant	effects,	 the	LRC	said,	were	 the	Bail	Amendment	
(Repeat	Offenders)	Act	2002	(NSW)	and	the	Bail	Amendment	(Firearms	and	Property	Offenders)	
Act	2003	(NSW).	The	former	Act	created	three	exceptions	to	the	presumption	in	favour	of	bail:	
anyone	accused	of	an	offence	whilst	on	bail	or	parole;	anyone	previously	convicted	of	failure	to	
appear;	and	anyone	accused	of	an	indictable	offence	who	has	previously	been	convicted	of	one	
or	more	 indictable	 offences.	 The	 stated	 intention	 of	 the	 legislation	was	 to	 reduce	 the	 rate	 of	
absconding	 on	 bail	 following	 a	 NSW	 BOCSAR	 study	 (Chilvers,	 Allen	 and	 Doak	 2002)	 which	
showed	higher	absconding	rates	among	persons	with	prior	convictions	and	multiple	concurrent	
offences.	A	BOCSAR	evaluation	of	 these	changes	showed	that	 they	had	the	effect	of	 increasing	
the	rate	of	bail	refusal	by	10.3%	for	those	with	prior	convictions,	7.3%	for	those	appearing	with	
an	 indictable	 offence	 with	 a	 prior	 indictable	 conviction;	 15.5%	 for	 defendants	 who	 had	
previously	 failed	 to	 appear;	 and	 14.4%	 for	 Indigenous	 adults	 (Fitzgerald	 and	 Weatherburn	
2004:	1).	The	 later	Act	 targeting	 repeat	property	offenders	extended	the	presumption	against	
bail	 to	 include	 firearms	 related	 offences	 and	 people	 charged	with	 serious	 firearm	offences	 (s	
8B);	and	people	charged	with	two	or	more	serious	property	offences	who	had	previously	been	
convicted	of	similar	offences	within	the	previous	two	years	(s	8C).	Serious	property	offences	are	
defined	to	include	robbery,	breaking	and	entering,	and	car	theft.	
	
The	 ‘exceptional’	 nature	 of	 NSW	developments	was	 noted	 by	 Steel	 (2009)	who	 compiled	 the	
following	 table	 of	 what	 he	 called	 ‘punitive’	 changes	 to	 bail	 legislation	 across	 the	 Australian	
jurisdictions.	
	
Table	1:	Number	of	‘punitive’	changes	to	bail	legislation,	1992‐2008		
State	jurisdiction	 Number	
Tasmania	 1	
Queensland	 3	
South	Australia	 4	
Victoria	 6	
Western	Australia	 7	
Northern	Territory	 7	
Australian	Capital	Territory	 9	
New	South	Wales	 25	
Source:	Steel	(2009)	
	
The	cumulative	effects	of	the	many	changes	to	the	Bail	Act	1978	(NSW)	were	summarised	by	the	
then	NSW	Australian	Labor	Party	Attorney	General,	John	Hatzistergos,	in	2007	in	the	course	of	
introducing	yet	another	amendment	bill.		
	
New	South	Wales	now	has	the	toughest	bail	 laws	in	Australia.	Over	the	 last	 few	
years	we	have	cracked	down	on	repeat	offenders	–	people	who	habitually	come	
before	 our	 courts	 time	 and	 again.	 Part	 of	 those	 changes	 includes	 removing	 the	
presumption	 in	 favour	 of	 bail	 for	 a	 large	 number	 of	 crimes.	 We	 have	 also	
introduced	 presumptions	 against	 bail	 for	 crimes	 including	 drug	 importation,	
firearm	 offences,	 repeat	 property	 offences	 and	 riots,	 and	 an	 even	 more	
demanding	 exceptional	 circumstances	 test	 for	 murder	 and	 serious	 personal	
violence,	including	sexual	assault.	
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Those	types	of	offenders	now	have	a	much	tougher	time	being	granted	bail	under	
our	rigorous	system.	These	extensive	changes	have	delivered	results.	There	is	no	
doubt	 that	 the	 inmate	 population,	 particularly	 those	 on	 remand,	 has	 risen	
considerably	as	a	result	of	the	changes.	In	fact,	the	number	of	remand	prisoners	
has	increased	by	20	per	cent	in	the	last	three	years	alone	and	new	jails	are	being	
opened	to	accommodate	 the	 increase.	The	 latest	 figures	 from	New	South	Wales	
re‐offending	database	on	bail	decisions	have	shown	that	from	1995	to	2005	bail	
refusals	 in	the	District	Court	and	Supreme	Courts	have	almost	doubled,	with	an	
increase	from	25.8	per	cent	to	46.4	per	cent.	(Hatzistergos	2007:	2670;	quoted	in	
NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	3.68)	
	
Shifting	conceptions	of	bail:	From	ensuring	attendance	and	integrity,	to	crime	prevention	
The	previous	section	outlined	the	legislative	hyperactivity	in	NSW,	evident	in	the	sheer	scale	of	
amendments	 to	 the	Bail	Act	 1978	 (NSW).	While	 similar	 trends	were	 apparent	 in	other	 states	
and	 Territories,	 NSW	 was	 exceptional,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 what	 Steel	 (2009)	 calls	
‘punitive’	amendments.	The	effects	of	these	amendments	were	spelt	out	in	unapologetic	terms	
by	 the	 NSW	Attorney	 General	 in	 2007,	 quoted	 above.	 These	 effects	 have	 not	 come	 about	 by	
accident	 or	 as	 a	 side	 effect;	 they	 have	 largely	 been	 intended	 consequences	 of	 the	 desire	 to	
restrict	access	 to	bail	 in	 relation	 to	a	wide	 range	of	alleged	offences	and	alleged	offenders,	 in	
particular	those	with	a	record	of	previous	offences.		
	
While	the	political	drivers	and	the	effects	of	legislative	hyperactivity	are	clear,	less	clear	are	the	
accompanying	shifts	in	conceptual	understandings	of	the	purposes	of	bail.	This	section	will	offer	
a	brief	overview	of	some	suggested	shifts.	It	will	be	argued	that	conceptions	of	bail	have	shifted	
from	that	of	a	basically	procedural	mechanism	to	ensure	the	attendance	of	the	accused	at	trial	
and	 protect	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 trial	 process	 against	 interference	 with	 witnesses	 or	 the	
destruction	of	 evidence,	 to	a	 substantive,	 independent	 forum	 in	which	crime	prevention	aims	
are	pursued.	While	often	not	explicit,	crime	prevention	is	pursued	through	the	rise	of	risk‐based	
mentalities,	 manifested	 for	 example	 in	 the	 increased	 legislative	 emphasis	 on	 categories	 of	
offence	and	on	previous	convictions,	as	grounds	for	bail	refusal.	These	categories	of	offence	and	
prior	convictions	stand	in	as	very	general	markers	of	risk	in	a	number	of	senses.	First	there	is	
the	 actual	 risk	 of	 absconding,	 interfering	 with	 witnesses	 or	 evidence,	 or	
reoffending/threatening	 community	 safety;	 second	 the	 risk	 to	 broad	 notions	 of	 community	
fears	 and	anxieties;	 and	 third	 the	political	 risk	 to	governments	of	 serious	offences	 committed	
whilst	 on	 bail.	 While	 the	 first	 of	 these	 forms	 of	 risk	 is	 ostensibly	 focused	 on	 the	 individual	
accused,	 the	 elaborate	 legislative	 schema	 of	 presumptions	 based	 on	 offence	 type	 serves	 to	
deflect	that	focus	onto	the	accused’s	membership	of	pre‐set,	 legislatively	defined	categories	or	
populations.	 The	 second	 and	 third	 forms	 of	 risk	 are	 not	 specifically	 within	 the	 realm	 of	
legitimate	legal	considerations	in	a	court	room	setting.	Nevertheless	they	conceivably	operate	at	
a	more	nebulous	 contextual	 level	 in	 relation	 to	 the	mentalities	 and	practices	of	bail	decision‐
makers	 such	as	police,	magistrates	and	 judges,	 tending	 to	produce	more	cautious,	 risk	averse	
and	 pre‐emptive	 decision‐making.	 (The	 increasingly	 theoretically	 sophisticated	 research	
literature	on	risk,	both	within	criminal	justice	(for	example	Zedner	2007,	2009,	2011)	and	more	
broadly	(for	example	Baker	and	Simon	2002;	Beck	1992;	O’Malley	2000,	2004,	2013)	has	been	
little	deployed	in	the	bail	field	(but	see	Hannah‐Moffat	and	Maurutto	2013)	and	is	not	entered	
into	here).	
	
The	complex	NSW	bail	scheme	based	on	specific	categories	of	offence	and	previous	convictions	
which	has	emerged	 from	a	process	of	constant	 legislative	amendment	 involves	 five	significant	
reconceptualisations	of	bail:	
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1. A	shift	of	focus	from	the	individual	case	to	the	category	of	offence;	
2. An	erosion	of	the	presumption	of	innocence;	
3. The	framing	of	a	false	opposition	between	individual	liberty	and	the	public	interest;	
4. The	creation	of	double	jeopardy	effect	through	the	focus	on	previous	convictions;	
5. The	development	of	an	unacknowledged	scheme	of	pre‐trial	preventive	detention.	
	
1.	 From	individual	case	to	category	of	offence	
Firstly,	the	scheme	involves	a	shift	from	assessment	of	the	individual	before	the	court,	and	the	
specific	circumstances	of	the	accused	and	of	the	case	alleged	against	them,	to	assessment	based	
on	prior	 legislatively	determined	categories	of	offence	and	offender.	 In	short	 it	 is	a	 shift	 from	
approaching	the	accused	as	a	specific	individual	before	the	court	(what	we	might	call	individual	
justice)	 to	 treating	 the	 individual	 as	 a	 member	 of	 a	 legislatively	 determined	 category	 or	
population.	 The	 alleged	 offender	 is	 judged	 or	 assessed,	 not	 against	 their	 individual	
circumstances,	 but	 as	 a	member	 of	 a	 population	 or	 category	 that	 is	 legislatively,	 rather	 than	
judicially,	assumed	to	present	a	higher	risk	of	non‐attendance	and	of	reoffending	whilst	on	bail.	
In	a	 fundamental	 sense,	 this	approach	 is	a	departure	 from	the	basic	 rule	of	 law	principle	 that	
justice	must	be	done	in	the	individual	case.	It	is	not	strictly	a	form	of	actuarial	risk	assessment	
as	the	offence	categories	attracting	a	restriction	or	removal	in	the	presumption	in	favour	of	bail	
are	broadly	framed	and	their	selection	reflects	a	concern	with	all	three	forms	of	risk	highlighted	
above,	namely	risk	of	reoffending,	risk	to	community	fears	and	anxieties,	and	political	risk.		
	
The	shift	from	judicial	adjudication	to	legislative	categorisation	is	most	obviously	demonstrated	
in	 forms	 of	 mandatory	 or	 grid	 sentencing,	 but	 is	 also	 apparent	 in	 lesser	 forms	 of	 legislative	
prescription	of	the	type	seen	in	the	constant	legislative	amendments	to	bail	legislation	outlined	
above.	In	a	robust	early	chapter	of	the	Bail	report,	Bail	and	the	criminal	justice	system,	the	NSW	
LRC	outlined	a	set	of	principles	‘that	protect	liberty	and	fairness	in	the	criminal	justice	system’	
(NSW	LRC	2012:	paras	2.9‐2.35),	arguing	that	‘bail	legislation,	being	part	of	the	criminal	justice	
system,	should	be	constrained	by	the	same	principles’	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	2.11).	One	of	these	
principles	is	 ‘individualised	justice	and	consistency	in	decision‐making’	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	
2.10).	The	Commission	noted	that	to	achieve	a	decision	appropriate	‘in	all	the	circumstances	of	
the	 case’	 involves	 the	 exercise	 of	 ‘a	 broad	 discretion.	 An	 overly	 prescriptive	 approach	 to	 bail	
creates	 complexity	 and	 inflexibility	 for	 decision‐makers’	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 para.	 2.28).	 The	
Commission	agreed	with	an	earlier	Victorian	Law	Reform	Commission	Report	(VLRC	2007)	that	
‘a	 simpler	 Bail	 Act	 based	 on	 fundamental	 principles	would	 best	 accommodate	 the	 important	
values	 of	 individual	 individualised	 justice	 and	 consistent	 decision	making’	 (VLRC	 2007:	 para.	
2.32).	
	
2.	 Eroding	the	presumption	of	innocence	
Secondly,	the	scheme	involves	a	significant	downplaying	of	the	importance	of	the	presumption	
of	innocence.	The	more	bail	is	approached,	not	as	a	procedural	stage	in	the	criminal	process	or	a	
mechanism	 for	 assuring	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	 forthcoming	 trial	 at	 which	 culpability	 will	 be	
determined	but	as	a	platform	of	adjudication	in	its	own	right,	where	crime	prevention	and	other	
sentencing,	 control	 and	 therapeutic	 aims	 can	 be	 pursued,	 the	 more	 the	 presumption	 of	
innocence	is	undermined.	This	diminution	in	awareness	of	and	commitment	to	the	presumption	
of	innocence	is	exemplified	in	the	NSW	Attorney	General’s	parliamentary	speech	quoted	above	
where	he	 states	 ‘those	 types	of	 offenders	now	have	 a	much	 tougher	 time	being	 granted	bail’.	
These	comments	concern	persons	who	are	yet	to	stand	trial	but	who	are	confidently	asserted	to	
be	 ‘types	of	offenders’,	on	the	basis	of	 the	types	of	offence	they	have	been	charged	with.	Such	
comments	contribute	to	the	erosion	of	the	presumption	of	innocence.	Nor	is	this	effect	peculiar	
to	 NSW.	 In	 a	 study	 of	 policing	 bail	 conditions	 in	 Victoria,	 police	 persistently	 referred	 to	 the	
accused	as	the	‘offender’	(Colvin	2009:	51)	These	examples	of	the	erosion	of	the	presumption	of	
innocence	 in	 daily	 practice	 and	 language	 underscores	 the	 important	 discussion	 in	 the	 NSW	
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LRC’s	Bail	 report	 of	 the	 fundamental	 principles	underlying	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	These	
were	 seen	 as	 including:	 the	 right	 to	 personal	 liberty;	 the	 presumption	 of	 innocence;	 no	
detention	without	 legal	 cause;	no	punishment	without	due	process;	a	 fair	 trial;	 individualised	
justice	and	consistency	 in	decision‐making;	and	special	provision	for	young	people	(NSW	LRC	
2012:	9).		
	
3.	 Framing	a	false	opposition:	individual	liberty	v	public	interest	
Thirdly,	the	rise	in	risk	analysis	has	contributed	to	a	common	framing	of	bail	in	terms	of,	on	the	
one	 hand,	 ‘balancing’	 the	 personal	 interests	 of	 the	 accused	 person	 against,	 on	 the	 other,	 the	
collective,	 public	 or	 societal	 interest	 in	 safety	 or	 protection	 from	 crime.	 This	 is	 a	 serious	
misconception	which	has	significant	effects	on	public,	media,	political	and	legal	debate	and	the	
potential	 outcomes	 of	 reform	 processes.	 Following	 the	 lead	 of	 Judge	 Cross	 in	 R	 v	Wakefield	
(1969:	300)	who	noted	that	‘such	an	approach	will	inevitably	lead	to	error’	(R	v	Wakefield	1969:	
325)	the	NSW	LRC	Report	usefully	highlighted	this	conceptual	mistake.	
	
The	 error	 lies	 in	 seeing	 the	 interest	 in	 liberty,	 and	 indeed	 in	 the	 other	
fundamental	principles	of	the	law	such	as	the	presumption	of	innocence	and	the	
right	to	a	fair	trial,	as	interests	of	the	individual	and	in	particular	the	individual	
defendant.	Conceiving	them	in	this	way,	within	the	familiar	metaphor	of	balance,	
renders	one	far	more	likely	to	see	them	as	of	less	weight	than	social,	community	
or	 public	 interests.	 [But]	 the	 interest	 in	 liberty	 and	 fundamental	 principles	 is	
correctly	 seen	 as	 a	 collective,	 social,	 public	 interest.	 The	 issue	 then	 is	 one	 of	
reconciling	 or	 evaluating	 the	 strength	of	 competing	public	 interests.	 (NSW	LRC	
2012:	para.	3.12)	
	
4.	 Focus	on	previous	offences	creates	a	double	jeopardy	effect	
Fourthly,	an	element	of	double	jeopardy	arises	in	that	people	are	being	denied	bail	on	the	basis	
of	previous	offences	for	which	they	have	already	been	punished.	The	double	jeopardy	effect	is	
even	more	marked	in	the	 light	of	bail	research	which	 follows	from	Feeley	(1979)	onwards,	 to	
the	 effect	 that	 ‘the	 process	 is	 the	 punishment’.	 Certainly	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 there	 is	 a	 range	 of	
adverse	consequences	that	flow	from	being	remanded	in	custody	as	distinct	from	being	granted	
bail,	 the	most	severe	of	which	 is	death	 in	custody	(see	generally	Brown	et	al.	2011:	166‐191)	
along	with	a	range	of	effects	on	health,	physical	and	mental	(Indig	et	al.	2010,	2011).	While	 it	
might	be	argued	that	punishment	 is	not	 the	aim	or	 intention	of	 remand	in	custody,	 it	 is	 likely	
that	the	accused,	who	is	yet	to	be	found	or	to	plead	guilty,	may	well	experience	remand	custody	
as	 a	 form	 of	 punishment,	 particularly	 those	 5,218	 remandees	 (55%)	 who	 are	 subsequently	
found	not	guilty,	discharged,	or	found	guilty	and	sentenced	to	a	non‐custodial	penalty	(NSW	LRC	
2012:	para.	4.16).	The	NSW	LRC	Report	listed	the	effects	of	custodial	remand	as:	no	opportunity	
to	prepare	for	prison;	a	higher	rate	of	assaults	than	sentenced	prisoners;	deleterious	effects	on	
the	 ability	 to	 secure	 a	 fair	 trial;	 increasing	 the	 likelihood	 of	 guilty	 pleas,	 conviction	 and	 a	
sentence	of	imprisonment;	the	criminogenic	effect	of	mixing	with	sentenced	prisoners	and	high	
risk	 remandees;	 and	 the	 unavailability	 of	 rehabilitation	 programs	 to	 remandees	 (Grunseit,	
Forell	 and	 McCarron	 2008;	 NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 paras	 5.35‐5.50).	 These	 were	 in	 addition	 to	 a	
substantial	list	of	hardships	of	imprisonment	more	generally,	such	as	physical	and	psychological	
hardships	and	effects	on	family	and	children,	which	are	not	specific	to	remand	prisoners	(NSW	
LRC	2012:	paras	65‐69).	In	addition	there	are	the	significant	financial	costs	to	the	community	of	
high	remand	rates	given	the	average	daily	cost	of	imprisonment	of	$276	per	day	for	adults	and	
$589	per	day	for	juveniles	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	5.51).		
	
5.	 Unacknowledged	pre‐trial	preventive	detention	
Fifthly,	 the	 legislative	 structuring	 of	 differential	 rules	 for	 defendants	 according	 to	 offence	
categories	 and	 previous	 offences,	 together	with	 the	 shift	 from	 concern	 about	 attendance	 and	
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integrity	of	 the	 trial	process	 to	 crime	prevention,	has	arguably	produced	a	 system	of	massive	
and	 largely	 unacknowledged,	 or	 backdoor,	 pre‐trial	 preventive	 detention,	 which	 in	 numbers	
dwarfs	 the	 formal	 systems	 of	 preventive	 detention	 such	 as	 those	 which	 provide	 for	 post‐
sentence	detention	or	supervision	of	serious	sex	offenders.	Between	2003	and	2009,	across	the	
five	Australian	States	that	provided	for	post‐sentence	detention	or	supervision,	165	applications	
were	 granted	 out	 of	 205	made.	 In	 NSW	 the	 vast	 bulk	 of	 these	were	 supervision	 rather	 than	
detention	orders	(Baldry	et	al.	2011:	33).	While	25%	of	the	NSW	prison	population,	or	roughly	
2,500	 persons,	 are	 unconvicted,	 as	 at	 2011,	 only	 two	 persons	 in	 NSW	 were	 serving	 post‐
sentence	detention	orders	(Baldry	et	al.	2011).	The	differences	do	not	end	there.	The	hearings	of	
applications	 by	 the	 Crown	 for	 post‐sentence	 detention	 orders	 involve	 high	 quality	 legal	
representation,	 the	 adducing	 of	 extensive	 evidence,	 including	 from	 psychologists	 and	
psychiatrists	 and	 often	 involving	 risk	 assessment	 instruments,	 full	 forensic	 argument	 and	
detailed	 judicial	 consideration	by	 a	 Supreme	Court	 judge.	 In	 contrast,	 in	many	 bail	 decisions,	
accused	persons	are	unrepresented	or	represented	by	busy	duty	solicitors,	decisions	are	made	
on	 little	 evidence,	 mainly	 police	 submissions	 from	 the	 bar	 table,	 and	 are	 made	 in	 hearings	
lasting	a	few	minutes,	largely	by	magistrates,	and	indeed	in	some	cases	by	the	police	in	the	first	
instance.	Further,	the	decisions	are,	as	seen	above,	often	strongly	determined	by	the	legislative	
framework	of	presumptions,	so	heavily	inflected	by	recent	legislative	hyperactivity	and	framed	
around	 categories	of	 offence	 charged	and	prior	offences,	 rather	 than	 full	 consideration	of	 the	
individual	circumstances	of	the	individual	case.		
	
Illustrations	 of	 the	 conceptual	 shifts	 outlined	 above	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 a	 significant	 development	
which	has	contributed	indirectly	to	the	rise	in	remand	populations,	namely	the	explosion	in	bail	
conditions	and	the	consequent	rise	in	revocations	brought	about	by	more	intensive	policing	of	
bail	conditions.		
	
The	explosion	in	conditional	bail	
There	has	also	been	an	explosion	in	the	extent	and	number	of	bail	conditions	imposed	by	police	
and	courts	in	recent	years.	Common	conditions	include	the	requirement	of	reporting	to	police,	
curfews,	 non‐association	 conditions,	 conditions	 that	 specify	 where	 the	 person	 must	 reside,	
where	they	can	go,	what	reasonable	directions	they	must	observe,	and	not	to	consume	alcohol	
and	 drugs.	 While	 these	 are	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘conditions’,	 the	 NSW	 LRC	 sought	 to	
distinguish	between	conditions	as	a	requirement	that	must	be	met	before	release	can	take	place	
(for	 example	 financial	 conditions,	 provision	 of	 a	 surety,	 surrender	 of	 passport)	 and	 ‘conduct	
requirements’	which	are	conditions	embodied	in	a	bail	agreement	(NSW	LRC	2012:	paras	12.4‐
12.5).	The	attaching	of	conditions	has	become	something	of	a	pro	forma	practice,	a	checklist	or	
‘tick	the	box’	approach,	with	minimal	consideration	of	the	appropriateness	of	the	conditions	or	
their	effects,	particularly	in	relation	to	young	people	and	those	with	mental	health	or	cognitive	
impairments.	 Young	 people,	 in	 particular,	 are	 being	 set	 up	 to	 fail.	 The	 current	 position	 was	
succinctly	summarised	by	 the	Chief	Magistrate	of	 the	NSW	Local	Court	 in	a	submission	 to	 the	
NSW	LRC.	
	
Overly	 complex	 or	 onerous	 reporting	 requirements	 that	 go	 beyond	 those	
reasonably	 necessary	 to	 secure	 an	 accused	 person’s	 attendance	 at	 court	 are	
commonly	seen	in	conditions	of	police	bail	or	are	being	sought	in	applications	for	
bail	before	the	court,	notwithstanding	the	requirement	of	section	37(2)	that	the	
conditions	imposed	on	a	grant	of	bail	are	to	be	no	more	onerous	than	appear	to	
be	 required.	 The	 Court	 is	 exposed	 to	 constant	 applications	 for	 review	 of	 bail	
conditions	and	observes	that	in	the	majority	of	cases	such	applications	are	wholly	
or	partially	successful,	in	most	cases	with	the	consent	of	the	prosecuting	agency.	
(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	12.7)	
	
David	Brown:	Looking	Behind	the	Increase	in	Custodial	Remand	Populations	
	
IJCJ&	SD					89	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2013	2(2)	
This	 submission	 was	 strongly	 supported	 by	 submissions	 from	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 legal	 and	
advocacy	services,	which	provided	the	LRC	with	numerous	examples,	such	as	the	following.	
	
Example	1	
LA	was	charged	with	resist	police	and	possession	of	an	illicit	substance.	She	was	
apprehended	 in	 Kings	 Cross.	 Police	 released	 her	 on	 bail,	 with	 one	 of	 her	
conditions	being	that	she	was	restricted	from	going	within	1000	metres	of	Kings	
Cross	railway	station.	
	
She	 was	 subsequently	 arrested	 in	 Kings	 Cross	 again	 sharing	 needles,	 and	 was	
taken	 into	 custody.	An	application	 for	bail	was	made	before	 the	 court,	 and	bail	
was	 granted	 with	 the	 same	 conditions,	 namely	 that	 she	 not	 go	 within	 1000	
metres	of	Kings	Cross	railway	station.	
	
The	 bail	 condition	 presented	 considerable	 difficulties	 for	 LA	 as	 she	 needed	 to	
enter	the	Kings	Cross	area	to	access	her	doctor	and	her	methadone	clinic.	
	
An	application	for	variation	of	the	bail	conditions	was	made,	with	the	conditions	
being	varied.	(NSW	LRC	2012:	Example	12.1)	
	
Example	2	
A	Legal	Aid	Children's	Legal	Service	client	was	charged	with	committing	affray.	In	
the	experience	of	Legal	Aid	solicitors	 it	 is	standard	practice	at	Bidura	Court	 for	
magistrates	 in	 such	 cases	 to	 impose	 a	 place	 restriction	 encompassing	 a	 2	 km	
radius	 from	 Sydney	 Town	 Hall.	 The	 magistrate	 accordingly	 imposed	 this	
condition,	giving	no	consideration	to	the	fact	that	the	defendant	would	breach	the	
condition	every	 time	she	 travelled	 to	school,	visited	 the	Department	of	 Juvenile	
Justice	in	accordance	with	another	bail	condition,	or	visited	her	sister,	who	lived	
in	Redfern.	
	
Example	3	
Another	example	 involved	a	case	where	 four	co‐accused	children	were	charged	
with	entering	enclosed	lands	and	put	on	bail	to	not	associate	with	each	other	and	
to	obey	a	strict	curfew.	Three	of	 the	children	were	cousins	and	two	lived	in	the	
same	house.	Three	were	subsequently	arrested	for	breaching	their	bail	less	than	
seven	 days	 after	 police	 bail	 was	 granted.	 Two	 out	 of	 the	 four	 were	 first	 time	
offenders.	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	12.21)	
	
The	NSW	LRC’s	conclusion	was	that:	
	
Conduct	requirements	appear	to	be	imposed	routinely	and	unnecessarily	without	
tailoring	 to	 the	 situation	 of	 the	 individual.	Monitoring	 for	 compliance	by	police	
has	become	more	active	and	intense	in	recent	times.	Arrest	for	failure	to	comply	
has	been	 increasing.	We	have	no	statistically	significant	evidence	of	a	reduction	
in	crime	as	a	result.	…	Intensive	enforcement	of	routinely	imposed	conditions	is	
creating	 unnecessary	 public	 costs	 and	 unnecessary	 hardship,	 particularly	 for	
young	people,	without	apparent	benefit	to	the	community.	(NSW	LRC	2012:	paras	
12.73,	12.75)	
	
Eat	your	dinner	or	have	your	bail	revoked	
Many	 of	 the	 examples	 set	 out	 by	 the	 NSW	 LRC	 or	 provided	 by	 legal	 services	 in	 the	 field,	
illustrate	the	way	that	bail	is	being	pressed	into	service	as	a	new	form	or	lever	of	control	which	
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extends	 far	 beyond	 crime	 or	 crime	 prevention.	 Despite	 the	 criticism	 of	 Freiberg	 and	Morgan	
that:	 ‘the	 concepts	 of	 “conviction”	 and	 “sentence”	 have	 been	 eroded	 by	 the	 proliferation	 of	
dispositions	 in	the	form	of	diversion	programs	and	orders’	 (2004:	221)	and	that	 ‘the	 limits	of	
bail	 are	 difficult	 to	 determine’	 (Freiberg	 and	Morgan	 2004:	 223),	 the	 use	 of	 bail	 to	 anchor	 a	
range	of	semi‐coerced	therapeutic	processes,	such	as	drug	and	alcohol	rehabilitation	programs	
under	s	36A	of	the	Bail	Act	1978	(NSW),	has	generally	been	viewed	as	largely	benign	(see	NSW	
LRC	2012:	paras	13.24‐13.34).	Such	initiatives	are	linked	to	notions	of	therapeutic	justice,	which	
seek	to	shift	conceptions	of	the	court,	especially	Lower	Courts,	away	from	crime	control	to	that	
of	casualty	ward	or	triage	station,	a	point	of	intervention	and	‘leverage’	where	a	range	of	social,	
medical	 and	welfare	 services	 can	 be	 deployed.	While	 it	 is	 recognised	 that	 there	 is	 a	 level	 of	
coercion	in	using	bail	as	a	condition	of	program	participation,	the	issues	of	problematic	consent,	
lack	of	 ‘legal	and	moral	foundations	of	guilt	and	conviction’	(Freiberg	and	Morgan	2004:	221),	
and	of	‘conceptual	confusion’	and	the	‘distortion	of	legal	structures’	(Freiberg	and	Morgan	2004:	
234)	highlighted	by	Freiberg	and	Morgan	tend	to	be	skirted	over	in	the	interests	of	managing	or	
governing	 individuals	 towards	 safer	 and	 healthier	 lifestyles	 and	 living	 conditions,	which	 it	 is	
hoped	will	also	reduce	offending.		
	
The	heavy	weight	 that	bail	 is	 increasingly	asked	 to	bear	and	the	significant	distance	 travelled	
from	 the	 principle	 of	 no	 punishment	 without	 due	 process	 are	 exemplified	 in	 the	 following	
example	cited	by	the	NSW	LRC.		
	
Carl	 is	 twelve	 years	 old	 and	 has	 a	 cognitive	 impairment	 that	 means	 he	 often	
misbehaves	and	is	difficult	to	control.	As	a	result	he	lives	in	supported	housing,	
where	 those	 caring	 for	 him	 find	 him	 hard	 to	 discipline.	 Carl	 was	 arrested	 for	
assault	and,	at	the	request	of	his	carer,	one	of	the	conditions	of	his	bail	was	that	
he	eat	his	dinner	every	night.	If	Carl	fails	to	do	so,	he	breaches	his	bail	and	could	
be	placed	on	remand.	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	12.29)	
	
While	 having	 every	 sympathy	 for	 those	 charged	 with	 assisting	 and	 managing	 cognitively	
impaired	and	unruly	young	people,	there	is	a	fundamental	question	about	the	appropriateness	
of	the	threat	of	remand	in	custody	for	not	eating	your	dinner.	The	LRC	described	such	cases	as	
examples	 of	 ‘inappropriate,	 welfare	 oriented	 or	 overly	 onerous	 conditions’	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	
para.	12.29).	In	this	example	law	is	being	deployed	far	beyond	its	sphere	of	competence,	a	move	
which	undermines	its	legitimacy	and	credibility.	Any	link	to	crime	or	even	crime	prevention	has	
been	 lost	 here;	 bail	 law	 is	 being	 drafted	 in	 to	 assist	 in	 the	 mundane	 management	 of	 social,	
welfare	 and	 medical	 problems	 for	 which	 it	 is	 ill	 equipped	 and	 inappropriate	 (see	 generally	
Bargen	2009‐2010;	Boyle	2009;	McFarlane	2010;	cf	Hannah‐Moffat	and	Maurutto	2013).	
	
Bail	revocation:	Breaching	conditions,	policing	practices	and	the	role	of	KPIs	
The	proliferation	of	bail	conditions	coupled	with	more	aggressive	monitoring	of	compliance	by	
the	police	has	produced	a	significant	 increase	in	revocations	of	bail,	particularly	 in	relation	to	
young	 persons.	 In	 NSW	 in	 2001,	 there	 were	 6%	 of	 detentions	 for	 breach	 relative	 to	 total	
detentions	 of	 juveniles	 pending	 completion	 of	 proceedings.	 That	 figure	 had	 increased	 to	
between	 20%	 and	 23%	 from	 2007	 onwards.	 Greater	 levels	 of	 police	 enforcement	 are	 also	
increasing	bail	 revocations	 for	 adults.	Between	2001	and	20011	there	was	an	average	annual	
percentage	change	of	16.7%	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	12.68).		
	
It	is	instructive	to	look	behind	these	breach	figures	to	a	largely	unacknowledged	shift	in	policing	
practices	 which	 has	 produced	 them.	 The	 shift	 in	 strategies	 has	 come	 about	 in	 a	 rather	
roundabout	way.	 In	NSW	in	2006	an	ALP	State	Plan	 identified	reducing	recidivism	as	a	major	
priority	and	set	the	target	of	a	reduction	in	recidivism	by	10%	by	2016.	Other	parts	of	the	NSW	
State	Plan	promote	‘widening’	of	the	application	of	early	intervention	programs,	in	addition	to	
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reducing	 court	 appearances	 for	 young	 people	 by	 ‘better	 use	 of	warnings,	 cautions	 and	Youth	
Justice	Conferencing’	(NSW	Government	2010:	56).		
	
One	mechanism	for	reducing	recidivism	was	identified	as	stricter	monitoring	of	bail	compliance,	
on	the	assumption	that	those	on	bail	were	a	group	of	high	risk	offenders	especially	likely	to	re‐
offend.	This	concern	was	translated	into	a	new	set	of	police	Key	Performance	Indicators	(KPIs),	
which	 required	 the	 police	 to	 step	 up	 compliance	 checks,	 of	 bail	 conditions	 such	 as	 curfew,	
residence,	place,	non‐association,	educational,	work,	alcohol	and	drug	conditions.	The	conduct	
of	specific	compliance	checks	has	become	incorporated	into	daily	policing	routines	in	a	way	that	
is	easily	measurable	compared	to	the	more	generalised,	discretion‐based,	routine	police	patrol	
or	community	 liaison	work.	The	new	KPIs	are	popular	with	police	as	 they	provide	a	clear	cut	
measure	 of	 their	 work	 rate	 which	 can	 be	 counted	 and	 thus	 readily	 applied	 to	 ‘productivity	
rates’,	local	area	command	assessments,	and	promotion	prospects.	In	this	somewhat	backhand	
way,	 without	 explicit	 amendment	 to	 the	 bail	 legislation	 or	 clear	 parliamentary	 debate,	 crime	
prevention	 through	 significantly	 increased	 police	monitoring	 of	 bail	 conditions	 has	 become	 a	
new	part	of	the	function	of	bail	
	
The	 police	 have	 taken	 to	 this	 enhanced	 task	 and	 the	 KPIs	 by	 which	 they	 themselves	 are	
increasingly	 evaluated,	 with	 evident	 relish.	 Police	 Annual	 Reports	 refer	 to	 ‘nightly	 bail	
compliance	checks,	particularly	on	juveniles’	and	the	allocation	of	‘Bail	Compliance	Operations’	
as	 a	 ‘key	 outlook’	 (NSW	 Police	 Force	 2008:	 15;	 Young	 2010:	 8).	 Specific	 police	 targeting	
operations	 such	 as	 ‘Operation	 Avert’,	 a	 bi‐annual	 program	 which	 targets	 outstanding	 arrest	
warrants	 and	 bail	 compliance,	 have	 drawn	 high	 police	 and	 political	 praise.	 For	 example	 the	
results	 of	 one	 weekend	 state‐wide	 operation	which	 resulted	 in	 89	 arrests	 for	 breach	 of	 bail	
were	 described	 by	 Deputy	 Commissioner	 Owens	 as	 demonstrating	 ‘an	 effective	 strategy	 in	
putting	offenders	before	the	courts’	(NSW	Police	Force		2010:	1‐2,	cited	in	Young	2010:	8).	Then	
Minister	 for	 Police,	 Michael	 Daley,	 expressed	 similar	 sentiments	 about	 earlier	 operations	
declaring,	‘[p]olice	aren’t	sitting	on	their	hands	…	they’re	well	and	truly	on	the	front	foot,	taking	
known	 criminals	 off	 the	 street’	 (Daley	 2009:	 1).	 The	 ‘high	 visibility’	 Operation	Avert	 in	 2013	
conducted	over	three	days,	included	1903	bail	compliance	checks	which	contributed	to	charges	
for	940	 ‘offences,	 including	…	breach	of	bail’,	and	was	 judged	by	Assistant	Commissioner	Alan	
Clarke	 as	 an	 ‘effective	 strategy’	 ‘to	 take	 repeat	 offenders	 off	 the	 streets’	 (NSW	 Police	 Force	
2013).		
	
Such	claims	are	made	despite	the	fact	that	those	on	bail	are	not,	at	least	on	the	current	charge,	
proven	‘repeat	offenders’;	that	breach	of	a	bail	condition	is	not	a	criminal	offence	(Bail	Act	1978	
(NSW)	ss50,	51);	and	that	police	arrest	powers	regarding	breach	of	bail	conditions	require	the	
arrested	person	to	be	brought	before	a	court	so	the	issue	of	bail	can	be	re‐determined	(Bail	Act	
1978	(NSW)	s50	(1)(a)).	Further	 there	 is	no	evidence	 that	higher	remand	rates	 translate	 into	
safer	communities	(Noetic	Solutions	2011:78;	Vingnaendra	et	al.	2009:	4).	Fishwick	and	Bolitho	
note	 the	 inconsistency	 of	 pursuing	 the	 objective	 of	 ‘keep[ing]	 the	 community	 safe	 through	
tightened	monitoring	 of	 those	 at	 high	 risk	 of	 offending’	 and	 reducing	 recidivism,	 when	 ‘it	 is	
widely	recognised	that	putting	young	people	into	custody	will	not	reduce	recidivism,	no	matter	
how	it	is	measured’	(Fishwick	and	Bolitho	2010:	173;	see	also	Stubbs	2009:	253).	
	
Pre‐sentence	punishment	
A	recent	study	conducted	by	Courtney	Young	based	on	in‐depth	interviews	in	an	unnamed	NSW	
country	town	revealed	widespread	disquiet	among	 local	 lawyers	about	police	bail	compliance	
tactics,	 especially	 in	 relation	 to	 Aboriginal	 children	 (Young	 2010).	 One	 judicial	 officer	
interviewed	 referred	 to	 a	 case	 of	 a	 defendant	 who	 breached	 his	 daily	 reporting	 condition	
because	 he	 was	 bailed	 to	 an	 address	 30km	 out	 of	 town,	 despite	 having	 no	 history	 of	
unreliability,	 saying	 the	 police	 ‘were	 just	 narking	 him,	 that’s	 all	 they	 were	 doing	 …	 it’s	
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transparent	 that	 they	 put	 conditions	 of	 bail	 in	 place	…	 to	 create	 hardship	 for	 people’	 (Young	
2010:	 14‐15).	 One	 local	 legal	 practitioner	 stated	 that	 there	 is	 an	 ‘awful	 lot	 of	 extra	 curial	
punishment	 in	bail	conditions’	but	 ‘you’re	not	allowed	to	say	 that’	 (Young	2010:	16).	Curfews	
were	the	most	complained	about	condition	with	many	stories	of	young	people	being	breached	
in	 circumstances	where	 their	 parents	were	 responsible	 for	 taking	 them	 out	 after	 the	 curfew	
(Young	2010:	17).	One	practitioner	asked:	what	was	his	client	‘Karina’,	a	13	year	old	Aboriginal	
girl	to	do;	‘walk	back	home	...	in	the	hours	of	darkness	…	placing	her	on	the	vulnerable	list	…	or	
was	 she	 to	 stay	 there	 safe	with	 family	 and	 run	 the	 gauntlet	 that	 the	 police	 do	 not	 go	 to	 her	
residence’	(Young	2010:	17).	Another	practitioner	highlighted	the	case	of	‘Sarah’,	a	13	year	old	
girl	 who	 allegedly	 stole	 a	 lipstick	 from	 a	 supermarket.	 Sarah	was	 bailed	 subject	 to	 a	 curfew	
which	confined	her	to	her	home,	except	to	attend	school.	 In	the	practitioner’s	view,	 ‘it’s	house	
arrest.	 It’s	punishment	pre‐sentence’	 (Young	2010:	18).	Night	 curfews	were	often	 imposed	 in	
relation	to	minor	offences	such	as	shoplifting	which	were	alleged	to	have	occurred	during	the	
day.	 One	 practitioner	 claimed	 that	 10pm	 and	 2am	 curfew	 checks	 are	 ‘all	 the	 Night	 Shift	 are	
doing’.	 Many	 of	 the	 participants	 recounted	 incidents	 of	 police	 ‘knocking	 on	 doors	 at	 3am’,	
‘shining	torches	through	windows’	and	‘wandering	around	yards’	(Young	2010:	19).	
	
This	pattern	of	bail	compliance	policing	was	confirmed	in	numerous	submissions	made	to	the	
NSW	Law	Reform	Commission	from	a	wide	range	of	front	line	community	agencies,	from	which	
the	following	examples	are	drawn.		
	
Example	4	
Despite	Ben’s	lack	of	criminal	record	or	prior	contact	with	police,	he	was	placed	
on	onerous	bail	conditions	including	non‐association	with	8	of	his	friends,	and	a	
curfew	from	8pm	to	6am.	
	
Not	only	was	the	curfew	unwarranted	in	the	circumstances	(the	alleged	offence	
was	 committed	 in	 the	 afternoon),	 it	 had	 a	particularly	harsh	 impact	because	of	
the	police	practice	of	‘bail	compliance	checks’.		
	
For	 several	 weeks,	 police	 turned	 up	 almost	 every	 night	 (sometime	 between	
11.30pm	and	 3am)	 at	 Ben’s	 house	 to	 check	 that	 he	was	 abiding	by	his	 curfew.	
This	caused	Ben	and	his	foster	family	much	distress.	There	is	a	4‐year‐old	child	in	
the	family	home	who	was	awoken	each	night	and	who	had	trouble	getting	back	to	
sleep.	The	neighbours	were	also	becoming	upset	with	 the	voices	and	police	car	
lights	 interrupting	 their	 sleep	almost	every	night.	 (NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	12.22,	
Example	12.3)	
	
Example	5	
A	 16‐year‐old	 Legal	 Aid	 client	 named	 Kristy	 was	 charged	 with	 aggravated	
robbery	and	assault	occasioning	actual	bodily	harm	for	an	incident	where	it	was	
alleged	that	she	and	a	friend	robbed	the	victim	of	a	mobile	phone.	Prior	to	these	
charges,	Kristy	had	had	no	dealings	with	police.	One	of	the	bail	conditions	set	for	
her	was	that	she	be	home	between	7pm	and	7am.	Kristy	lived	with	her	father	and	
her	9‐year‐old	sister.		
	
Police	conducted	bail	compliance	checks	on	Kristy	over	a	three	month	period	on	
average	five	nights	a	week.	This	was	despite	the	fact	that	during	this	time	Kristy	
attended	all	of	her	court	appearances	and	did	not	commit	any	offences.	The	times	
the	 checks	 were	 carried	 out	 varied:	 for	 example,	 8.45pm,	 3.10am	 and	 6.50am.	
The	bail	compliance	checks	were	noticed	by	other	residents	of	the	unit	block	in	
which	Kristy's	family	lived	and	caused	significant	embarrassment	to	the	family.	
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Kristy	applied	to	the	Supreme	Court	for	a	bail	variation.	The	Court	removed	the	
curfew	condition.	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	12.36,	Example	12.6)	
	
Example	6	
A	Legal	Aid	client	who	was	a	young	single	mother	was	alleged	to	have	committed	
a	minor	offence	unlikely	to	attract	a	custodial	sentence.	As	a	condition	of	her	bail	
she	was	 required	 to	 report	 daily	 to	 the	 police.	 On	 one	 particular	 day	 her	 one‐
year‐old	 child	 was	 very	 sick,	 vomiting	 so	 much	 as	 to	 suffer	 dehydration.	 As	 a	
result,	 she	 was	 unable	 to	 report	 that	 day.	 She	 reported	 the	 next	 day	 and	 told	
police	what	had	happened.	Police	arrested	her	and	kept	her	in	custody	for	most	
of	the	day	until	she	was	granted	bail,	despite	the	fact	that	they	did	not	dispute	her	
explanation	 or	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 charges	 were	 minor	 and	 unlikely	 to	 attract	 a	
custodial	sentence.	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	12.39,	Example	12.7)	
	
Julie	 Stubbs	 notes	 that	 ‘data	 indicate	 a	 250%	 increase	 in	 arrests	 for	 outstanding	 warrants	
and/or	breach	of	bail	from	2003‐04	to	2007‐08’	across	both	adults	and	juveniles	(Stubbs	2010:	
496‐7).	The	Police	 submission	 to	 the	NSW	Law	Reform	Commission	 inquiry	 strongly	 justified	
this	 pattern	 of	 compliance	 checking	 as	 being	 ‘in	 line	 with	 [NSW	 Police	 Force]	 strategies	 of	
predominantly	 targeting	high‐risk	 (being	 recidivist,	 serious	 and	violent)	offenders’	 (NSW	LRC	
2012:	 para.	 12.44)	 and	 as	 securing	 deterrence	 from	 offending,	 ‘building	 rapport	 with	 young	
people	and	their	families’,	reinforcing	community	expectations	and	preventing	victimisation	of	
young	people	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	12.41).	In	addition:	
	
Commands	also	viewed	bail	compliance	checks	as	an	investigative	tool	[emphasis	
added].	 Juveniles	 on	 conditional	 bail	 known	 for	 offences	with	 a	 similar	modus	
operandi	 had	 curfew	 checks	 conducted	 on	 them	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 incident	 was	
reported	to	rule	them	out	as	possible	suspects.	
	
Targeting	 is	 risk	 based.	 It	 considers	 the	 juvenile’s	 profile	 as	 well	 as	 the	 crime	
environment	[emphasis	added]	in	the	local	area.	(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	12.40).	
	
The	LRC	noted	that:	
	
The	 NSW	 Police	 Force	 …	 states	 that	 the	 number	 of	 bail	 compliance	 checks	
conducted	per	month	on	young	people	has	increased	approximately	400%	from	
January	 2007	 to	 September	 2010.	 (In	 the	 2007/08	 financial	 year,	 there	 were	
25,712	bail	compliance	checks	on	young	people	recorded	in	the	police	computer	
system.	In	the	2009/10	financial	year,	there	were	more	than	40,799	such	checks).	
(NSW	LRC	2012:	para.	12.43)	
	
Revocations	of	bail	for	breaches	of	conditions	is	contributing	significantly	to	the	
rise	 in	 remand	 rates	 in	 relation	 to	 young	 people.	 Briefly,	 the	 number	 of	 young	
people	 remanded	 for	 breach	 of	 bail	 conditions	 only	 has	 increased	 from	193	 in	
2000‐01	to	1142	in	2010‐11.	The	average	length	of	stay	for	a	young	person	who	
is	 bail	 refused	 for	 breach	of	 bail	 conditions	 is	 14	hours	 46	minutes.	 (NSW	LRC	
2012:	59,	para.	4.47)		
	
Aftermath	to	the	NSW	LRC	Report	
As	 the	 discussion	 above	 has	 drawn	 heavily	 on	 the	 NSW	 LRC	 Report	Bail	 (2012),	 it	 is	 worth	
briefly	noting	its	aftermath.	Before	the	final	version	was	settled	and	the	Report	released	in	April	
2012,	a	preemptive	attack	was	made	on	both	the	prospective	Report	and	the	Attorney	General,	
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by	prominent	talk	back	radio	host	Ray	Hadley	and	the	Daily	Telegraph	 (Clennell	2012,	2012a,	
2012b;	cf	Clennell	2012	(‘How	DPP	Greg	Smith	went	from	Rambo	to	cream	puff’),	2012b	(‘Gays	
and	 lesbians	will	 be	given	a	get‐out‐of‐jail‐free	 card	under	proposals	 to	 soften	 the	 state’s	bail	
laws	currently	before	Attorney	General’);	MediaWatch	2012).	These	attacks	continued	once	the	
Report	 had	 been	 released	 (Clennell	 2012c,	 2012d	 (‘Accused	murderers	 and	 rapists	would	 be	
allowed	out	of	 jail	while	awaiting	trial,	under	an	overhaul	of	NSW	bail	 laws’);	cf	Akland	2012;	
Humphries	2012;	Patty	2012,	2012a).		
	
In	November	2012	the	Attorney	General	Greg	Smith	released	the	NSW	Government’s	response	
to	 the	Report	 (NSW	Government	2012).	The	response	 indicated	 that	a	new	Bail	Act	would	be	
introduced	 in	 2013	 that	 will	 do	 away	 with	 offence‐based	 presumptions	 and	move	 to	 a	 risk‐
based	assessment	 requiring	 the	bail	 authority	 to	 assess	 the	 risk	posed	by	 an	accused	person.	
The	 NSW	 LRC	 Report	 had	 recommended	 a	 uniform	 presumption	 in	 favour	 of	 bail	 for	 all	
offences.	The	response	stated	that:	
	
The	 Government	 anticipates	 that	 dispensing	 with	 the	 system	 of	 presumptions	
will	 not	 only	 simplify	 the	 bail	 decision	 making	 process,	 but	 will	 also	 result	 in	
fewer	 amendments	 to	 the	 legislation	 enabling	 it	 to	 remain	 simple	 and	 clear,	 as	
was	 intended	 when	 the	 original	 bail	 laws	 were	 codified	 in	 1978	 (NSW	
Government	2012:	7).		
	
In	May	2013	the	NSW	Attorney	General	introduced	the	Bail	Bill	2013	into	the	NSW	parliament.	
As	 foreshadowed	by	 the	Attorney	General,	 the	Bill	 abolishes	 the	 system	of	presumptions	and	
moves	 to	 an	 ‘unacceptable	 risk’	 test.	 A	 bail	 authority	 is	 to	 consider	 whether	 there	 is	 any	
‘unacceptable	risk’	that	an	accused	person	will	fail	to	appear;	commit	a	serious	offence,	which	is	
not	 specifically	 defined	 but	 includes	 sexual	 or	 violent	 offences	 or	 offences	 where	 there	 was	
alleged	use	of	an	offensive	weapon;	endanger	the	safety	of	victims;	or	interfere	with	witnesses.	
Bail	 can	 only	 be	 refused	 if	 there	 is	 an	 unacceptable	 risk	 that	 cannot	 be	 mitigated	 by	 the	
imposition	of	bail	conditions.	Bail	conditions	can	only	be	imposed	for	the	purpose	of	mitigating	
an	unacceptable	risk.	A	 flow	chart	outlining	 the	basic	 ‘unacceptable	risk’	bail	decision‐making	
process	is	included	in	the	Bill.		
	
A	 bail	 authority	 is	 required	 to	 have	 regard	 to	 the	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 and	 the	 general	
right	 to	 be	 at	 liberty.	 There	 is	 a	 right	 to	 release	 for	 minor	 offences,	 including	 all	 fine‐only	
offences	and	most	offences	under	the	Summary	Offences	Act	1988	(NSW),	but	conditions	can	still	
be	imposed.	Conditions	generally	must	be	‘reasonable,	proportionate	to	the	alleged	offence	and	
appropriate	to	address	the	unacceptable	risk	in	relation	to	which	they	are	imposed’,	 ‘must	not	
be	more	 onerous	 than	 is	 necessary	 to	mitigate	 that	 risk’	 and	 compliance	with	 the	 conditions	
must	be	‘reasonably	practical’	(Smith	2013).	The	types	of	condition	mirror	those	in	the	existing	
Act.	The	Bill	specifies	the	actions	a	police	officer	can	take	in	relation	to	failure	to	comply	with	a	
bail	 acknowledgement	 or	 bail	 conditions.	 The	 officer	 may	 ‘decide	 to	 take	 no	 action,	 issue	 a	
warning,	issue	an	application	notice	or	court	attendance	notice	to	the	person	requiring	them	to	
attend	court,	arrest	the	person,	or	apply	for	an	arrest	warrant’	(Smith	2013).	The	Bill	retains	the	
controversial	 provision,	 s	 22A,	 which	 restricted	 second	 or	 subsequent	 release	 applications	
made	 to	 the	 same	 court,	 but	 exempts	 juveniles	where	 the	 previous	 application	was	made	 on	
their	first	appearance.		
	
In	his	second	reading	speech	the	Attorney	General	noted	that	the	Government	expects	the	new	
Act	 to	 commence	 operation	 approximately	 12	 months	 from	 the	 date	 of	 its	 assent.	 This	 is	
because	 ‘its	 new	 bail	model	 is	 a	 paradigm	 shift’	 that	will	 require	 ‘an	 education	 campaign	 for	
police,	 legal	practitioners	and	courts	regarding	the	new	legislation’	and	changes	 in	technology	
information	systems	and	 forms	(Smith	2013).	The	proposed	Bill	drew	a	mixed	response	 from	
commentators	(see	Patty	2013;	Taylor	2013).	
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Conclusion	
The	aim	of	this	article	has	been	to	look	behind	the	increase	in	remand	in	custody	rates	in	NSW,	
although	 that	 increase	 has	 been	 common	 across	 a	 number	 of	 Australian	 jurisdictions	 and	 is	
reflected	in	national	figures.	The	immediate	drivers	of	the	NSW	increase	were	identified	by	the	
NSW	LRC	as	increasing	rates	of	bail	refusal	in	both	Local	and	Higher	Courts;	an	increase	in	the	
average	time	spent	on	remand;	a	decrease	in	the	extent	to	which	bail	is	‘dispensed	with’;	and	an	
increase	 in	 the	 frequency	of	bail	 revocations	 (NSW	LRC	2012:	paras	4.8‐4.31).	Where	NSW	 is	
distinctive	 is	 that	 the	 predominant	 driver	 of	 the	 increases	 has	 been	 a	 form	 of	 legislative	
hyperactivity	 involving	 constant	 changes	 to	 the	 Bail	 Act	 1978	 (NSW),	 changes	 which	 have	
removed	or	restricted	the	presumption	in	favour	of	bail	for	a	wide	range	of	offences.	
	
As	 well	 as	 charting	 these	 developments	 the	 article	 has	 attempted	 to	 delineate	 some	 of	 the	
underlying	processes	that	have	accompanied	increasing	remand	rates.	These	include	a	number	
of	conceptual	shifts	in	the	way	bail	is	conceived,	including	the	use	of	bail	for	crime	prevention	
purposes	 and	 an	 increasing	 emphasis	 on	 risk.	 These	 conceptual	 shifts	 are	 observable	 in	 the	
explosion	in	bail	conditions,	many	of	which	are	onerous	and	inappropriate,	and	the	KPI‐driven	
policing	of	bail	conditions	and	consequent	rise	in	revocations,	especially	in	relation	to	juveniles.	
The	 article	 has	 drawn	on	 the	NSW	Law	Reform	Commission	Report	 to	 illustrate	 and	 support	
some	of	 these	arguments.	This	 raises	 the	 issue	of	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	NSW	Government’s	
proposed	 Bail	 Bill	 2013,	 based	 partly	 on	 the	 NSW	 LRC	 Report,	 will	 address,	 alleviate	 or	
accelerate	the	various	processes	and	conceptual	shifts	argued	above.		
	
The	 simplest	 answer	 to	 that	 question	 is:	 it	 remains	 to	 be	 seen.	 It	 seems	 likely	 that	 such	 a	
significant	change	in	the	legislative	framework,	in	particular	sweeping	away	the	complex	system	
of	presumptions	 in	favour	of	an	 ‘unacceptable	risk’	model,	will	have	both	direct	consequences	
and	will	 feed	 into	more	 complex	 and	mediated	 cultural	 and	organisational	 changes.	However	
the	exact	relationship	between	legislative	provisions	and	the	social	and	organisational	contexts	
and	 cultural	 dispositions	 surrounding	 remand	 decision‐making	 and	 trends	 are	 difficult	 to	
delineate,	as	the	Sarre,	King	and	Bamford	(2006)	research	cited	earlier,	demonstrates.	A	study	
of	offending	on	bail	 in	England	found	that	 ‘the	changes	 in	remand	decision	making	…	seem	to	
reflect	broader	political	 and	media	debate	about	offending	on	bail	 rather	 than	changes	 in	 the	
legislation’	(Hucklesby	and	Marshall,	2000:	167).	(For	an	attempt	to	elaborate	on	the	notion	of	
penal	culture	and	its	relationship	to	rising	imprisonment	rates	in	Australia	and	elsewhere,	see	
Cunneen	 et	 al.	 2013.)	 The	 NSW	 Attorney‐General’s	 reference	 to	 the	 Bill	 as	 constituting	 a	
‘paradigm	shift’	and	the	delay	to	enable	an	education	campaign	signifies	 that	more	 than	mere	
cosmetic	changes	are	intended.	There	is	clearly	an	attempt	to	address	certain	of	the	conceptual	
shifts	 identified	above;	 for	example,	 in	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	bail	 authority	have	 regard	 to	
the	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 and	 the	 general	 right	 to	 be	 at	 liberty.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 clear	
intention	 to	 wind	 back	 the	 explosion	 in	 bail	 conditions	 and	 to	 reduce	 bail	 revocations	 by	
directing	 police	 to	 consider	 a	 range	 of	 options	 short	 of	 arrest	 for	 breach	 of	 conditions.	 The	
sweeping	away	of	the	complex	system	of	presumptions	potentially	returns	the	attention	of	bail	
decision‐makers	away	from	pre‐determined	legislative	categories	based	on	offence	type	to	facts	
and	circumstances	of	the	individual	case,	enlarging	judicial	discretion.	
	
The	big	unknown	 is	exactly	how	the	simplified	 ‘unacceptable	risk’	model	will	operate.	Clearly	
risk	will	be	more	central	to	the	new	scheme	and	exactly	how	that	plays	out	is	difficult	to	predict.	
A	pessimistic	reading	is	that	‘unacceptable	risk’	will	license	an	expansion	of	what	O’Malley	calls	
‘speculative	 pre‐emption’	 (O’Malley	 2013:	 187)	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 ever	 more	 imaginative	 fears	
about	an	accused’s	propensity	to	commit	future	offences	and	to	threaten	community	safety	and	
fears	of	the	fall	out	should	such	cases	occur.	An	optimistic	reading	is	that	the	new	scheme	may	
focus	less	on	speculative	fears	and	more	on	actual	evidence	of	risk,	at	the	same	time	as	fostering	
what	O’Malley	calls	greater	’resilience’	(O’Malley	2013:	187)	in	bail	decision‐making.	The	task	is	
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to	distinguish	real	threats	that	accused	people	may	abscond	(as	distinct	from	failing	to	turn	up	
for	 a	myriad	 of	 reasons),	may	 interfere	with	witnesses	 or	 evidence,	 and	may	 commit	 further	
very	 serious	 crimes,	 from	 generalised	 fears	 of	 the	 various	 repercussions	 of	 such	 occurrences	
and	 from	 the	 plethora	 of	 technical,	 administrative	 breaches	 of	 bail	 conditions	 that	 are	 non‐
threatening.	 It	may	be	 that	 the	debate	 surrounding	 the	 Law	Reform	Commission	 Inquiry	 and	
Report	and	the	Attorney	General’s	response	has	already	had	an	effect	on	bail	decision‐makers	
and	 on	 the	 complex	 organisational	 and	 cultural	 climate,	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 a	more	 ‘resilient’	
attitude	 to	 the	 grant	 of	 bail.	 In	 that	 regard	 it	 is	 interesting	 that	 the	 average	 daily	 number	 of	
young	people	in	custody	in	NSW	has	dropped	from	a	high	point	of	434	in	2009‐10	to	307	in	May	
2013	(NSW	DJJ	2013)	prior	to	any	legislative	changes.		
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